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Abstract 
For financial regulators seeking to use regulatory requirements to manage risk in a banking 
system, there can be a concern that such requirements crowd out efforts by banks to develop 
their own risk management systems. One way in which regulators have attempted to solve 
this problem is to enable banks to use internal risk models to satisfy regulatory 
requirements. Beginning with the 1996 Market Risk Amendment, the Basel framework has 
allowed banks to determine the capital charges associated with certain assets using their 
own internal risk models. But allowing the use of internal risk models has not been without 
controversy. Where some see an incentive for the development of internal risk management 
systems better able to address the unique risk profiles of particular banks, others see 
excessive complexity and uncertainty. And while some financial regulators are beginning to 
subject banks’ models to greater scrutiny, questions remain about the ability of financial 
regulators to provide effective oversight of such models.  
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1.  Introduction  
For financial regulators seeking to use regulatory requirements to manage the risk in a 
banking system, there can be a concern that such requirements crowd out efforts by banks 
to develop their own risk management systems. Banks subject to regulatory requirements 
may perceive the satisfaction of those requirements by itself as a sufficient response to risk. 
Or banks may believe they lack the resources to both meet regulatory requirements and 
develop their own risk management systems. Given that such systems, if robust, may be 
more effective in dealing with the unique risk profile of a particular bank than blanket 
requirements, there have been calls by regulators to “ensure that regulatory requirements 
do not impede the development of sound risk management by creating perverse incentives” 
(Bank for International Settlements 1995, 1-2). 
One way in which regulators have attempted to solve the problem of providing effective 
oversight of financial institutions without stunting the development of the financial 
institutions’ own risk management systems is to enable banks to use internal risk models to 
satisfy regulatory requirements. Beginning with the 1996 Amendment to the Capital Accord 
to Incorporate Market Risk (commonly referred to as the Market Risk Amendment), the 
Basel framework has allowed banks to determine the capital charges associated with certain 
assets using their own internal risk models rather than standardized capital charges applied 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to different categories of assets. With 
the capital charges produced by internal risk models typically lower than those produced 
using the standardized approach, the opportunity to use internal risk models has been 
widely seen as intended to incentivize the development of banks’ own risk management 
systems.      
But the incorporation of internal risk models as a cornerstone of the Basel framework has 
not been without controversy. Where some see an incentive for the development of internal 
risk management systems better able to address the unique risk profiles of particular banks, 
others see “a subsidy to complexity,” which makes “risk more difficult to monitor and 
manage, not less” (Haldane 2012, 17). With this complexity has often come uncertainty, with 
a series of recent studies illustrating the fact that different banks’ models can produce very 
different assessments of the riskiness of the same set of assets.   
In response to growing concerns about the use of internal risk models, some financial 
regulators are beginning to subject banks’ models to greater scrutiny. Yet questions remain 
about the ability of financial regulators to provide effective oversight of such models given 
their complexity and the difficulty government agencies face in hiring individuals with the 
necessary expertise in risk modeling. Furthermore, some banks have complained about the 
amount of resources necessary to respond to this added scrutiny, forcing some banks to run 
parallel models—one for the banks’ actual use and one to satisfy financial regulators.    
The remainder of the case is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
history of internal risk models. Section 3 outlines the adoption of internal risk models as part 
of the Basel framework. Section 4 discusses concerns that are emerging about the ability of 
banks to manipulate their internal risk models to achieve desired results. Section 5 
concludes with a summary of the current status of efforts by regulators to address the 
concerns raised by internal risk models. 
Questions 
1. Is the incorporation of internal risk models into regulatory frameworks a positive 
trend that incentivizes the development of banks’ own risk management systems or 
   
 
 
a negative trend that introduces too much complexity and subjectivity into such 
frameworks (or neither of the above, some of each, etc.)? 
2. Are financial regulators capable of providing effective oversight of banks’ internal 
risk models? 
2. History of Internal Risk Models 
Some commentators date the introduction of internal risk models to the late 1960s, when 
profound changes to the global economy produced a level of financial market turbulence not 
experienced since the Great Depression thereby necessitating increased attention to risk. 
Others argue that internal risk models date to the late 1970s and early 1980s, when high 
market volatility caused large investment banks to establish risk management departments. 
Regardless of the specific account selected, the common narrative is that at some point after 
the economic stability of the 1950s and early 1960s, conditions of market stress caused 
banks to pay increased attention to the amount of risk involved in their businesses.  
Charles Sanford (then head of Resources Management and later CEO) at Bankers Trust 
undertook early efforts to use modeling techniques to address this risk, developing along 
with Dan Borge the “risk-adjusted return on capital” metric or RAROC in the late 1970s. This 
measure compared the return produced by a transaction to the amount of capital that would 
need to be allocated to the transaction as a buffer against risk. Because the RAROC model 
determined this amount of capital based on its assessment of the maximum potential loss 
that could occur during a fixed period of time, many consider Charles Sanford and Dan Borge 
to be the fathers of the modern Value-at-Risk (VaR) model. 
Market Risk Models 
In 1994, the VaR approach became an increasingly popular way for banks to measure market 
risk (i.e., the risk of loss due to fluctuating prices for assets) with the introduction of J.P. 
Morgan’s RiskMetrics model. Widely disseminated by J.P. Morgan, the RiskMetrics model 
became the basis for much of the market risk modeling that occurred during this period 
(Nuxoll 1999). J.P. Morgan described the model as consisting of three basic components: 
1. A set of market risk measurement methodologies 
2. Data sets of volatility and correlation data used in the computation of market risk 
3. Software systems that implement the methodologies using the data sets 
At a very basic level, the RiskMetrics model involves the use of historical data to determine 
an estimated volatility for each type of risk (interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, etc.) 
associated with a given security and the correlation between the various types of risk. In its 
technical document describing the RiskMetrics model, J.P. Morgan gives the simple example 
of a U.S. corporation holding a government bond denominated in a foreign currency. Such a 
bond would be subject to two different, but potentially related types of market risk—interest 
rate risk (loss to the U.S. corporation resulting from a decline in the price of the bond due to 
an increase in interest rates) and foreign exchange risk (loss to the U.S. corporation resulting 
from a decline in the value of the foreign currency relative to the dollar).  
Historical data can provide an estimate of the maximum amount that the price of the bond is 
likely to drop over a given time period as a result of interest rate movement to a given degree 
   
 
 
of certainty (the interest rate VaR) and it can also provide an estimate of the maximum 
amount that the foreign exchange rate is likely to drop over the same time period to the same 
degree of certainty (foreign exchange VaR). But the total risk will not be simply the sum of 
the interest rate risk and the foreign exchange risk if there is a correlation between these 
two factors. Therefore, historical data also is used to determine the correlation between the 
interest rate risk and the foreign exchange risk for this type of bond. Using the RiskMetrics 
model, the corporation would have to determine the interest rate VaR, the foreign exchange 
VaR, and the correlation between the two risk factors, before using a formula derived from 
standard portfolio theory to calculate the total VaR for the bond. (For a detailed discussion 
of the methodology underlying the RiskMetrics model, see Longerstaey and Zangari 1996.) 
Figure 1: CreditMetrics Framework 
 
Source: Gupton et al. 1997.    
 
Credit Risk Models 
J.P. Morgan also developed what became the industry standard for models measuring credit 
risk (i.e., the risk of loss due to a counterparty failing to pay an amount owed), releasing 
CreditMetrics in 1997 (Nuxoll 1999). While J.P. Morgan describes CreditMetrics as 
“philosophically similar” to RiskMetrics, it notes one major difference in available data that 
drives much of the divergence between the models. Whereas when measuring market risk 
there is “an abundance of daily liquid pricing data on which to construct a model,” in the case 
of credit risk there is “relatively sparse and infrequently priced data on which to construct a 
model.” Therefore, “CreditMetrics seeks to construct what it cannot directly observe: the 
volatility of value due to credit quality changes” (Gupton et al. 1997, iii emphasis in original).  
The model does this by seeking to “balance the best of all sources of information in a model 
which looks across broad historical data rather than only recent market moves and across 
the full range of credit quality migration—upgrades and downgrades—rather than just 
default.” (The basic framework is depicted in Figure 1.) 
In its technical document describing the CreditMetrics model, J.P. Morgan gives the simple 
example of a portfolio consisting of two bonds: 
   
 
 
• Bond #1—BBB-rated, senior unsecured, 6% annual coupon, five-year maturity 
• Bond #2—A-rated, senior unsecured, 5% annual coupon, three-year maturity 
To determine the credit risk associated with each of the bonds by itself, the CreditMetrics 
model employs three steps tied to the three headings under the “Value at Risk due to Credit” 
heading of the framework diagram: Credit Rating, Seniority, and Credit Spreads. 
First, the bond issuer’s current credit rating determines the likelihood of a default or 
migration to another credit rating within a given timeframe. Based on historical data, 
CreditMetrics determines a “transition matrix” setting forth the percentage likelihood of a 
given migration. For example, the sample transition matrix in Figure 2 indicates that there is 
a 0.06% likelihood that a AAA issuer will be downgraded to BBB within one year but a 5.52% 
chance that an A issuer would experience such a downgrade. 
Figure 2: CreditMetrics One-Year Transition Matrix 
 
Source: Gupton et al. 1997.    
Second, armed with the percentage likelihood of a given credit migration, the CreditMetrics 
model calculates the value change likely to result from such migrations. Value upon default 
is determined based on historical data concerning rates of recovery in default given seniority 
class. For example, the sample chart in Figure 3 based on one set of historical data indicates 
that senior unsecured creditors can expect to recover an average of 51.13% of face value in 
the event of default. 
CreditMetrics determines value changes tied to non-default credit migrations by revaluing 
the expected cash flows from a bond (periodic interest payments and principal payment on 
maturity) using a discount rate tied to credit spreads between rating categories. 
Third, with the likelihood of a given migration and the value change that would result from 
such migration having been determined, CreditMetrics can produce an estimate of the 
maximum value change to a given degree of certainty. For example, in the table of migration 
probabilities and value changes in Figure 4, there is only a 1.47% chance that the BBB bond 
in question will migrate to B, CCC, or default. To this degree of certainty, the value of the bond 
will not fall below $98.10, or $8.99 below the mean of all scenarios.  




Figure 3: Recovery Rates by Seniority Class (% of face value, i.e., “par”) 
 
Source: Gupton et al. 1997.    
 
 
Figure 4: Calculating Volatility in Value Due to Credit Quality Changes 
 
Source: Gupton et al. 1997.    
The above steps concerned the calculation of the risk associated with a single bond. 
Returning to our model portfolio of two different bonds, as with the calculation of market 
risk by RiskMetrics, the total credit risk of the portfolio would not simply be the sum of the 
individual credit risk of each bond unless there was no correlation between the probability 
of credit migration and the resulting value changes of the two bonds. Thus, as with 
RiskMetrics, CreditMetrics relies on a determination of correlation grounded in historical 
   
 
 
data. (For a detailed discussion of the methodology underlying the CreditMetrics model, see 
Gupton et al. 1997.) 
Despite having been introduced nearly two decades ago, there is evidence that the 
methodologies underlying the RiskMetrics and CreditMetrics models continue to guide 
internal risk modeling today. (For more on internal risk models, see the YPFS Case Study 
Zeissler, et al. 2014C.) 
3. Internal Risk Models and Basel 
As discussed in greater detail in the YPFS Case Study Basel III A: Regulatory History 
(McNamara, et al. 2014A), the Basel framework as initially established by Basel I was 
directed primarily at credit risk. It wasn’t until 1996 that the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) addressed market risk with the Amendment to the Capital Accord to 
Incorporate Market Risk (commonly referred to as the Market Risk Amendment). Perhaps 
not surprisingly given its development during the same time period that banks were 
becoming increasingly active in financial modeling, the Market Risk Amendment added not 
only market risk to the Basel framework, but also the concept of allowing banks to use their 
own internal risk models to make determinations of risk. As the BCBS noted, in developing 
the Market Risk Amendment, it “took account of the fact that the risk management practices 
of banks have developed significantly since the initial proposals [about incorporating market 
risk into Basel] were formulated in the early 1990s.” Moreover, the BCBS expressed a desire 
not to impede further development of these practices by establishing regulatory 
requirements detached from banks’ own risk management systems (Bank for International 
Settlements 1995). 
As a result, the Market Risk Amendment provides banks with a choice between “two broad 
methodologies” in measuring market risk. The first methodology is a standardized approach 
based on risk measurements developed by the BCBS. The second methodology, available 
subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions and the explicit approval of a bank’s 
supervisory authority, allows for the use of internal risk models to determine risk 
measurements. Among the conditions outlined by the BCBS for use of internal risk models 
are: 
• Certain general criteria concerning the adequacy of the risk management system; 
• Qualitative standards for internal oversight of the use of models, notably by 
management; 
• Guidelines for specifying an appropriate set of market risk factors (i.e. the market 
rates and prices that affect the value of banks’ positions); 
• Quantitative standards setting out the use of common minimum statistical 
parameters for measuring risk; 
• Guidelines for stress testing; 
• Validation procedures for external oversight of the use of models; and 
• Rules for banks which use a mixture of models and the standardized approach. 
(Key elements of the different conditions are outlined in Figure 5.) 
   
 
 
With the development of Basel II, the BCBS expanded the ability to use internal risk models 
to determine risk measurements to credit risk as well. (For an overview of the use of internal 
risk models in measuring credit risk, see McNamara, et al. 2014D.) 
Figure 5: Conditions for Using Internal Risk Models 
 
   Source: Bank for International Settlements 1995 
4. Internal Risk Models and the Potential for Manipulation 
Although grounded in similar approaches, the various internal risk models deployed by 
different banks are comprised of a variety of components—risk measurement 
methodologies, historical data sets, software systems, etc.—differences in any one of which 
could result in models that, when presented with the same set of assets, arrive at very 
different assessments of risk. While the BCBS has argued that “it is desirable to have some 
diversity in risk modelling practices; if all banks modelled in the same way, they could create 
additional financial instability,” it has also noted that “it is undesirable for banks’ capital 
calculation inputs to generate excessive variation in risk measurement, as it would 
undermine the credibility of capital ratios, distort the international playing field and hamper 
the functioning of financial markets” (Bank for International Settlements 2013b, 3). And 
indeed, in the wake of the financial crisis there have been a series of studies that show that 
the risk assessments of banks’ internal models do vary drastically. 
In December 2013, the BCBS released the results of Phase II of an analysis of banks’ trading 
book risk-weighted assets (RWAs). This analysis presented 17 internationally active banks 
in nine jurisdictions with 42 different hypothetical trading portfolios to “test for the impact 
of differences in modelling across banks by controlling for portfolio composition” (Bank for 
International Settlements 2013b). The 42 different portfolios consisted of both plain vanilla 
   
 
 
and complex products in the five major asset categories identified by the BCBS: equity, 
interest rates, foreign exchange, commodities, and credit spread.  
According to the BCBS, individual positions contained within the hypothetical trading 
portfolios generated wide variations in some instances, variations which narrowed 
somewhat at the portfolio-level with more diversification. Still, even for the two most 
diversified portfolios in the exercise, the capital requirements calculated by the different 
models had a standard deviation of between 24% and 30% of the mean, a significant degree 
of variation. The capital requirements calculated ranged from €8.6 million to €18.5 million 
for one portfolio and from €6.3 million to €19.7 million for the other. Among the key drivers 
of this variation were the length of the data period used in a given model and the method 
used to aggregate general and specific risk (Bank for International Settlements 2013b).  
These results confirmed the findings of Phase I of the BCBS’s analysis, which presented 15 
internationally active banks with 26 hypothetical trading portfolios containing mostly 
simple products. Even with these more straightforward products, the different models had 
a standard deviation of 31% of the mean for calculated capital requirements of the most 
diversified portfolio, with outcomes ranging from €13.4 million to €34.2 million (Bank for 
International Settlements 2013a). 
In August 2013 the European Banking Authority (EBA) released a second interim report on 
a similar hypothetical portfolio exercise involving credit risk. The EBA’s exercise included 35 
banks from 13 EU countries and involved low default portfolios consisting of central 
government, credit institution and large corporate exposures. The EBA’s analysis found 
“significant variation in the [risk weights] and [expected losses] across banks.” Drivers of 
this variation include differences in definitions of default, differences in the granularity of 
credit ratings used, and data limitations (European Banking Authority 2013).   
With the potential for such wide variation of results based in significant part on the modeling 
choices that banks make (such as the length of data periods used), there have been growing 
concerns about the achievement of lower capital requirements through the manipulation of 
models rather than through the actual reduction of RWAs. (For a detailed examination of one 
possible case of such manipulation, see McNamara, et al. 2014D.) 
5. Regulator Response to Model Manipulation 
Particularly in light of the increased attention being paid to the complexity of internal risk 
modeling and the variability or even manipulation that can result, some financial regulators 
are beginning to subject banks’ models to greater scrutiny. For example in May 2014, the U.S. 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) announced a major expansion of its 
quantitative analysis function, focusing not only on enhanced evaluation of banks’ internal 
risk models as required by Dodd-Frank, but also on the creation of the OCC’s own models to 
vet the results of the banks’ models. The OCC’s staff of “quants”—the individuals charged 
with the OCC’s modeling efforts—recently increased from 31 quantitative economists to 53 
and from six research associates/financial analysts to seven after the financial crisis 
(LaCapra 2014).  
But the heightened regulatory scrutiny of internal risk models is not without detractors, even 
among other financial regulators. An anonymous U.S. Treasury official interviewed for the 
Reuters article announcing the OCC’s initiative characterized the effort as a waste of time, 
owing in part to the fact that government quants lack the experience of their private sector 
counterparts and would therefore be seconding-guessing models that they do not fully 
   
 
 
understand (LaCapra 2014). And indeed, recruiting and retaining experienced quants may 
be a tall order for regulatory agencies when even starting salaries for quants at major 
financial institutions are several times more than salaries for government quants. Notably, a 
senior quant recently hired as part of the OCC’s push was poached from another agency, not 
from the private sector (Ibid.).  
Banks themselves have also been critical of the move by some financial regulators to take a 
more active role in policing internal risk models. One major point of concern has been the 
increasingly large amount of quantitative resources banks must devote to regulatory 
compliance. The co-head of the quantitative group at Bank of America has estimated that 
such compliance represents more than half of his group’s work (Andersen 2014). Similarly, 
an industry headhunter believes that the amount of time quants spend on regulatory matters 
has increased from 30% pre-crisis to 50%-60% today (LaCapra 2014). According to some 
bankers, much of this additional work is unnecessary. An anonymous bank executive 
interviewed for the Reuters article described weeks of back and forth with the OCC over 
minor differences in model design that resulted in almost no difference in model outcome. 
According to the executive, the bank now runs two models concurrently—its own version of 
the model (which had already been approved by the Federal Reserve) and a different version 
to placate the OCC (Ibid.). 
Given the critical role internal risk models play in the Basel risk-weighted capital framework, 
determining how to provide oversight is a key challenge for regulators moving forward. This 
state of affairs raises the question of whether or not financial regulators are even in a 
position to provide effective and efficient oversight of banks’ internal risk models. This 
question is made even more urgent by the many new responsibilities being added to 
regulators’ plates around the world.  
Commentators have also proposed potential solutions that reduce the ability of banks to rely 
solely on the results of their internal risk models. First, regulators could establish floors 
below which capital requirements would not go regardless of the outcome of modeling. A 
drawback of such an approach is that the higher the floor is set, the less Basel-driven 
incentive there is for banks to invest time and resources in internal risk models. In extreme 
examples where the floor is set at what capital requirements would be using a standardized 
approach, there is no such incentive—using internal risk models to determine capital 
requirements could only result in higher capital charges, not lower capital charges. Such a 
situation would nullify one of the chief reasons for introducing the internal-risk-models 
approach to the Basel framework, which was to incentivize banks to further develop their 
own risk management systems given the promise of lower capital requirements.  
Another potential solution is the strengthening of the leverage ratio as a credible backstop 
to risk-based capital requirements. Based solely on a bank’s total exposures without any 
adjusting for risk, the leverage ratio is intended to be simpler and more transparent than 
risk-based capital requirements and is not subject to the same type of manipulation using 
internal risk models. A bank manipulating its internal risk models to arrive at artificially low 
risk-based capital requirements could still be reined in by a leverage ratio that is sufficiently 
robust. Ultimately, given the difficulty involved in effectively overseeing banks’ internal risk 
models and the potential problems with introducing model floors, it could be that the 
leverage ratio is the most important element of Basel III for addressing bank capital. 
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